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While global GDP growth continues unabated and inflation remains low, signs 
are emerging that the world economy may be headed toward a rough patch. 
As Éloi Laurent argues, this is because turbulences encountered by the United 
States and China — particularly income inequality and protectionist sentiment 
— are increasingly having global repercussions.  
Summer has not been kind to globalization. While there are no signs of a 
crash, doubts are increasing that the forward motion is perpetual.  
Trade talks could resume and by miracle finally lead to a deal. Even more 
unlikely, financial markets and central banks could manage to reassess risks 
and set prices accordingly in a sustainable manner. And yet globalization 
would still be in jeopardy.  
Contradictory times 
Few ideas seem as counterintuitive in the present. The world economy, now 
truly  
deserving its name, in 2006 concluded its most 
prosperous five-year term since 1945, with annual GDP 
growth of around 4%. International trade is buoyant, 
with exports growing twice as fast as global GDP for the 
last ten years. Global inflation is moderate, at around 
3%.  
As is well-known, the combination of those three 
dynamics — accelerated by ever more creative and free 
financial markets — is made possible by emerging 
market countries — or, more precisely, renascent 
nations. After all, Angus Maddison’s data show that 
they accounted for three-quarters of the world’s riches 
before 1820.  
Changing times 
The Churchillian wisdom after the battle of El-Alamein 
in 1942 once again makes full sense: “Now, this is not 
the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it 
is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.”  
According to Malcolm D. Knight, the General Manager of the Bank for 
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International Settlements, we should hail the “golden age” of globalization. 
“Golden age”? Now we know for sure that we are in trouble.  
Dangerous signs 
The nature of armed conflicts around the globe should wake us up from our 
sweet illusion. Contemporary wars are in their vast  
majority intra-national, not international. And 
economics is no different from politics in this respect.  
The globally pressing issue is not the promise of 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, which 
foresees and delivers mutual gains to nations opened to 
trade reciprocity.  
The problem lies with what one could call the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem curse — that is, the uneven 
distribution of those gains within each country 
according to skills. In a time of technological 
acceleration, technical progress and globalization 
conspire to fracture national compacts into separate 
and unequal societies.  
A long-standing dilemma 
The chicken or egg torment about the relationship between both factors and 
the rise of inequalities politically is of secondary order. The priority is to 
understand the difference between globalization and technical progress. People 
don’t revolt against technical progress, at least not anymore.  
The core of today’s globalization is transpacific, while the “first” globalization 
(1871-1914) was transatlantic. That is why the ever-growing turbulences 
encountered by the United States and China are bound to affect the world.  
Increasing inequality 
True, China is just the “C” in BRICs — and the BRICs are not the entire range 
of emerging countries. True as well, the EU’s internal and external trade  
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Still, there is little doubt that the United States and 
China are the two pillars of our globalization. Just think 
about growth of GDP, growth of trade and financial 
flows. And these very pillars may be vacillating.  
By a stunning historical coincidence, these two nations have also reached 
almost the exact same income inequality levels, in both cases, after a 
spectacular increase since the 1980s: Measured by the Gini index (0 = perfect 
equality, 1 = perfect inequality), China attained 0.472 in 2004 (according to 
the Asian Development Bank), while the United States reached 0.469 in 2005 
(according to the U.S. Census Bureau).  
Similar situation 
For all their ostensible — and real — differences, the two colossuses have 
simultaneously entered a critical zone.  
China is in the well-known situation of skyrocketing inequality brought about 
by the pressure of an economic catch-up resembling a forced march. But 
China’s head-spinning pace of development unsettles even the warmest 
partisans of an occidental path to stability, where political liberalization more 
or less smoothly follows economic take-off.  
Rising economic tension 
What if China stumbles and falls into a new Boxer 
revolt, fueled by insurrectional social unrest that tends, 
according to some observers, to intensify and 
aggravate in the current period?  
In any event, the anti-foreign sentiment is palpable. 
Restrictions against investment from abroad are 
increasing. All of the country’s economic sectors 
suddenly becoming “strategic.”  
Changing views 
Now regarding the United States, the country finds 
itself in the new, but empirically well-documented, context of increasing 
inequality — moving towards the “Victorian” levels of the early 20th century. 
In addition, the protectionist temptation has rarely been so powerful, even 
compared to the “Japan-bashing” era.  
According to the latest World Public Opinion poll, Americans — by a 60% 
majority — now consider international trade to be harmful to employment. 
They rank just behind the French (at 73%).  
As the U.S. Congress returns from its summer recess, legislation against 
currency manipulation targeting Beijing — which has already been publicly 
backed by Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton — awaits action.  
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Last but not least, a public debate  
— launched by MIT's Paul Samuelson in 2004 and 
boosted by Princeton's Alan Blinder a few months ago 
— now rages in academia between skeptics and 
unconditional free-traders.  
The anxiety of the latter ranks so high that more than a 
thousand of them, swallowing their methodological 
individualism, felt the need to solemnly reprimand the 
U.S. Congress from implementing Smoot-Hawley Tariff 
Act-like laws in a petition published on August 1, 2007.  
Relying on organizations 
This transpacific malaise — exacerbated this summer by the discovery of 
hazardous Chinese consumer products, the widening trade deficit and a 
slowing U.S. economy — is the most serious threat to the future of 
globalization.  
That applies even with regard to the current bout of very real instability in 
global financial markets — for which an end is not in sight.  
Oft-criticized though they are, both the OECD and the IMF have sensed the 
danger. One rang the alarm against the risk of rising wage inequalities in 
developed countries. The other lectured emerging countries on unfair 
exchange-rate policies.  
Solutions to the problem 
But what can the United States and China do in practice? Economic historians 
of the first  
globalization have shown that the political economy of 
openness leads to two types of national reaction to 
market integration: trade and financial protectionism on 
the one hand, and the development of the welfare state 
on the other.  
Those two policies are already implemented in our 
globalized world. The EU absorbs globalization with the 
welfare state — and India relies on protectionism to 
manage its development.  
The result is that — in contrast to the United States and 
China — the EU and India have close to the same low 
level of income inequality (with India reaching 0.36 in 
2004 and the EU 0.31 in 2005). It does not discourage 
protest, but it might avoid unrest.  
Together in a cause 
To their dismay, China and the United States may soon discover that 
globalization is very much like climate change: The accumulation of 
inequalities makes the level of “globophobia” climb so high that countries are 
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left with the need to combine adaptation tactics to a less fluid global economy 
and mitigation strategy.  
That requires them to understand how to reduce the level of inequality 
generated by the economic growth of recent decades. Since China and the 
United States now produce the same amount of greenhouse gases and have 
similar levels of income inequality, maybe they can learn how to reduce them 
simultaneously. 
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